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Abstract
Network scanning tools play a major role in Internet security.
They are used by both network security researchers and mali-
cious actors to identify vulnerable machines exposed on the
Internet. ZMap is one of the most common probing tools for
high-speed Internet-wide scanning. We present novel identifi-
cation methods based on the IPv4 iteration process of ZMap.
These methods can be used to identify ZMap scans with a
small number of addresses extracted from the scan. We con-
duct an experimental evaluation of these detection methods on
synthetic, network telescope, and backbone traffic. We man-
age to identify 28.5% of the ZMap scans in real-world traffic.
We then perform an in-depth characterization of these scans
regarding, for example, targeted prefix and probing speed.
1 Introduction
Internet wide scanning tools are commonly used by privacy
and security researchers and malicious actors. Use cases range
from anti-censorship techniques [25, 37] or computer secu-
rity [19] research, to commercial services [4, 15] and mali-
cious mass-exploitation [18]. Leonard et al. [27] proposed the
seminal work regarding high-speed uniformly spread Internet-
wide scanning. Durumeric et al. and Robert Graham then
published two tools, ZMap [9, 17] and Masscan [22], that
considerably eased Internet-wide scanning. This lead to a
constant use increase [29]. Security administrators monitor
their networks to detect attacks at several stages such as re-
connaissance, exploitation or command and control. Incident
response teams analyze network traffic logs to determine root
causes of compromise. Network scans are reconnaissance
events, and thus interest security administrators (as occurring
events) and incident response team (as security incident root
cause). These actors, however, often have trouble understand-
ing probing scope and purpose.
Previous work [14, 16, 29] analyzed ZMap usage in the
wild. These works use heuristics [14,16], signatures [29], and
the fact that ZMap sets the IP ID field to 54321, to identify
ZMap traffic. They also rely on privileged points of view on
traffic: a network telescope slightly smaller than a /9 prefix
for [16], and backbone traffic containing prefixes adding up
to a /13 prefix in [29]. Security administrators usually operate
smaller networks. It is thus more difficult for them to detect
incoming probing traffic [28], and to assess its nature.
Our goal is to identify ZMap scans and associated internal
characteristics from short sequences of observed packets. We
propose new methods to identify ZMap scans with or without
the IP ID fingerprint. These identification methods also re-
cover targeted prefix which can be used by administrators and
incident response teams to determine probing purpose. For
example, administrators can quickly discard indiscriminate
Internet-wide probing, and focus on scans that specifically
target their network. By recovering the internal state of ZMap,
we can also predict future probed addresses, and block re-
lated scanning traffic. Similarly, incident response teams can
use our identification methods to investigate scanning that
targeted a compromised host. Our methods are thus useful for
both real-time use cases (e.g. scan detection and probed IP
address prediction and blocking), and a posteriori ones (e.g.
network traffic forensics). Finally, we provide an in-depth
characterization of ZMap scans that goes beyond existing
work [14,16,29], for example regarding scan progress, packet
rates and unnecessary probing.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we propose two crypto-
analysis methods to identify ZMap scanning. Second, we
evaluate efficiency and computing cost using synthetic data
and real-world traffic captured from both network telescope
and backbone traffic. Third, we provide an in-depth analysis
of ZMap usage in the wild. We thus identify misuses, such
as private IP address probing and packet rate above upstream
capacity, that waste network resources.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 present ex-
isting work on probing and ZMap scan analysis. Section 3
details relevant aspects of ZMap design and implementation.
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Section 4 describes our identification methods. Section 5
presents our identification and characterization results.
2 Related work
Several works analyze scans in real-world traffic [10, 12, 21].
ZMap usage has been documented in network telescope [16]
and backbone data [29]. In [16], Durumeric et al. characterize
ZMap usage, packet rate, source IP location, targeted ports
and scan coverage. In [29], Mazel et al. describe the rise of
ZMap usage from 2013 to 2016.
Doerr et al. [14] follow an approach similar to ours. They
extract the internal state of ZMap to predict future probed IP
addresses and block forecasted traffic. To this end, they brute
force the sequence of observed IP addresses collected in a /16
network telescope using GPUs. Their work, however, exhibit
several limitations. First, they do not describe the blacklist
and offset mechanisms in ZMap. Second, they do not take into
account packet reordering which is an exteremely common
phenomenom in networks [11, 23, 31, 32, 36]. Third, they do
not provide any characteristics regarding observed scans.
We improve the work of Doerr et al. [14] by taking into
acount ZMap’s blacklist and offset mechanisms (see Sec-
tion 3). We also consider the impact of packet reordering on
our methods and provide a sampling methodology that alle-
viates its impact (see Section 5.2.5). By leveraging ZMap’s
internal state, we detail ZMap scans characteristics that were
not addressed in [16, 29], such as blacklist usage, targeted
prefix, packet rate, evidence of cooperation among sources,
scan progress and probe visibility (see Section 5.2.6 to Sec-
tion 5.2.9).
3 ZMap overview
We describe the process used by ZMap to iterate over the IPv4
address space. This process relies on modular arithmetic in
a finite field Fp defined by a prime number p. Mathematical
background can be found in [13].
The structure of the iterator can be decomposed into two
parts: the internal state s that is updated over the integers of
Fp and the function f that maps the internal state into an IPv4
address.
3.1 Internal state
At the initialization of the scan, a prime number p is selected
according to the number of IPv4 addresses to scan. If we
denote n this number of addresses, then p is the smallest prime
number among the integers {p0, ..., p4} to be be greater or
equal to n. The prime numbers p0, ..., p4 are predefined by
the ZMap implementation: p0 = 28 +1, p1 = 216 +1, p2 =
224+43, p3 = 228+3 and p4 = 232+15.
s0 s1
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Shard 0
Shard 1
Shard 2
(a) Original sharding [9]
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Shard 1
Shard 2
(b) New pizza-like sharding [5]
Figure 1: Sharding mechanisms used in ZMap.
A primitive root g of Fp and the initial internal state s0
are also randomly generated at the beginning of each scan.
If the random generator has good randomness properties, we
can suppose that these values are unique and characterize
each scan. Then, at each step i in {1, ..., p−2}, the state si is
updated according to the formula:
si = g · si−1 mod p (1)
ZMap supports distributed scans over several instances.
If this option is activated, the address generation process is
parallelized between the instances by splitting the sequence of
states into shards of equal length. To perform this task, ZMap
implements two types of sharding techniques that depend on
the software version.
Prior to a ZMap commit [5] on September 15, 2017, the
sharding technique was realized as follow : let d be the num-
ber of instances that perform the distributed scan. At the
initialization step, a primitive root g and a random number
s0 in Fp are shared between all the instances. Then, each in-
stance indexed by k in {0, ...,d−1} generates its own initial
internal state s0,k = s0 ·gk and the internal state si,k is updated
according to the formula:
si,k = gd · si−1,k mod p (2)
If we denote Shardk the set of internal states generated by
the instance k, then
Shardk =
{
si,k | i ∈
{
0, ...,
⌊ p−2
d
⌋}}
where
⌊ p−2
d
⌋
is the integer division of p−2 by d.
It is easy to notice that⋃
0≤k<d
Shardk = {si | i ∈ {0, ..., p−2}}= Fp \{0}
and the sets Shardk are disjoint. This allows to cover the
whole address space to scan without repetition of an address
into different shards. This method is depicted in Figure 1a.
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Since the ZMap version of September 15, 2017 [5], the
sharding technique has been modified. Each Shardk contains
the consecutive states si (i in {k · bp−2/dc, ...,(k+1) · bp−
2/dc− 1}) that would have been obtained with a non dis-
tributed scan . This is depicted in Figure 1b. With our previ-
ous notations, the internal state of the instance k is initialized
with s0,k = s0 ·gk·bp−2/dc and is updated according to:
si,k = g · si−1,k mod p (3)
In all these three settings, the choice of the values (g, s0)
is important as these values can be used to characterize the
scan. Two scans with the same couple of values (g,s0) will
generate the same IPv4 sequence of addresses. In the case of
distributed scans, it can also be used to identify the machines
that cooperate to the same scan. ZMap generates these values
pseudo-randomly by applying the block cipher AES to a se-
lected seed. By default, ZMap obtains the seed randomly from
the Unix /dev/random device. The user can, however, specify
a seed as an option (-e) or in the configuration file. Hence,
when the user repeatedly launches ZMap with a specific seed,
the same values (g, s0) are generated and the same sequence
of addresses will be probed.
3.2 Mapping function
The sequence of scanned IPv4 addresses is obtained by ap-
plying a mapping function f to the current internal state at
each step of the ZMap generation process.
The function f is built at the initialization of the scan and
depends on two parameters: a whitelist of IPv4 addresses W
and a blacklist B . The whitelistW contains the addresses that
the user has specified to scan and the blacklist B contains the
addresses to skip. Hence, if S is the set of IPv4 addresses that
will eventually be scanned, we have the relation S =W \B .
The function f is a one-to-one mapping from the inte-
gers {1, ...,n} to the address set S . The address sequence
(ip1, ..., ipn) is then obtained by applying f to the internal
states si when si ≤ n, as described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 IPv4 sequence generation (ip j) j∈{1,...,n}
j← 0
for i ∈ {1, ..., p} do
Update si using Eq. 1 (or Eq. 2,3 in case of sharding)
if si ≤ n then
ip j← f (si)
j← j+1
end if
end for
The construction of f relies on a tree structure T that speeds
up the computation of the addresses. T is a binary tree that
is built at the initialization of the scan, when the address lists
W and B are provided. The leaves of T represent disjoint
subnets of S and the union of the leaves covers S . The network
representation tl of a leaf l in T is the following: for each node,
we assign the label 0 to the left part of the tree under the node
and 1 to the right part. With this coding, a leaf l of T can be
represented as a finite sequence (x1, ...,xq) of node selections
where xi ∈ {0,1}. Using the CIDR notation, we associate to
l, the subnet tl ⊆ S whose prefix address is the bits (x1, ...,xq)
and the prefix length is q. Furthermore, by construction of T ,
we enforce that, for each leaf l, tl is maximal in S in the sense
that there is no subnet t ′ ⊆ S with tl ⊆ t ′ and prefix length
smaller than q.
At each level i, the nodes of T are labeled with the number
of addresses in S that fall in the subnet of prefix length i de-
fined by the node. When the building process of T is finished,
the mapping of an index x≤ n to an address is performed by
efficiently computing f0(x) = ip where ip is the xth address
in the list S ordered by the integer comparison of the host
byte representation of the IPv4 addresses. This computation
is performed by applying recursively Algorithm 2 to the tree
T .
Algorithm 2 Index to address function f0(T,x)
if T is a leaf l then
ip← x1 ·231+ x2 ·230+ ...+ xq+ x where (x1, ...,xq) is
the sequence that codes the leaf
return the IPv4 address corresponding to ip
else
Let T0 the left subtree of T
Let T1 the right subtree
Let n0 the label of the left node of T (number of ad-
dresses in the left subtree)
if x≤ n0 then
return f0(T0,x)
else
return f0(T1,x−n0)
end if
end if
3.3 Radix table
In the last versions of ZMap (starting from v1.1.0 which
was released on November 18th 2013), a lookup table called
the radix table is used for speeding up the computation of
the addresses in addition to the tree T . The radix table R
contains the CIDR addresses of all the subnets of prefix length
20 included in S . For these versions of ZMap, the mapping
function f can be decomposed into two subfunctions f0 and
f1. If the index x ∈ {1, ...,n} is less than nR ·212, where nR is
the length of the radix table, then the radix table R is used for
the computation and f (x) = f1(R,x). On the other hand, if
x > nR ·212, then the tree T built on the remaining addresses
of S is used and f (x) = f0(T,x−nR ·212).
3
The radix table R contains the CIDR addresses of all the
subnets of prefix length 20 included in S and is ordered by the
integer comparison of the prefix in their host byte representa-
tion. If i is an integer smaller than nR, R[i] is the ith subnet of
prefix length 20 included in S . Then f1(R,x) is defined as the
jth address of the subnet R[i] with i the integer division of x
by 212 and j = x mod 212 (see Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3 Index to address function f1(R,x)
i←
⌊ x
212
⌋
j← x− i ·212
ip← R[i] ·212+ j
return the IPv4 address corresponding to ip
4 ZMap detection methods
We present two detection methods of ZMap scans based on the
cryptanalysis of the IPv4 address generation. These methods
find the generator of the scan g given a few samples of IPv4
addresses extracted from the scan.
4.1 Observation network
We denote by O the set of IPv4 addresses that are monitored
by the administrator of a network. In the case of an Internet-
wide scan, some of the scanned addresses of S will reach the
observed network O. We then make several hypotheses.
First, the administrator can retrieve a significant part of
these addresses, and determine their arrival order. Notice that
we do not assume that all the scanned addresses that lay in the
set O are observed by the administrator: some loss can occur
during the capture of the packets. However, the capture quality
(packet loss rate and packet reordering) and the monitored
network size both affect the performance (speed and success)
of our detection methods.
Second, we also suppose that the observation network is
completely included in a subnet of the scanned addresses.
Formally, if we order the monitored addresses by their host
byte representation, we suppose that there is no IPv4 address
ip 6∈ S such that o1 < ip < o2 with o1,o2 in O. This occurs
when O is a single subnet and there is no blacklisted address
in O. Durumeric et al. [16] reported that they received exclu-
sion requests for 5.4 millions IP addresses. They thus added
21,094 subnets of prefix length 24 to the default blacklist [7].
This represents 0.1% of all subnets of prefix length 24. It
means that if O is a subnet of prefix length 16 (resp. 20), and
we consider the worst case where the blacklisted subnets are
uniformly distributed among the remaining subnetworks of
prefix length 24, then, the probability that O fulfill our hypoth-
esis is 72% (resp. 98%). This hypothesis on the observation
network can greatly simplify the computation of the mapping
function described in Section 3 as we show in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there is a subnet I such that O ⊆
I ⊆ S . Then there is an integer that we denote offset such
that for all x ∈ {1, ...,n} with f (x) ∈ O
f (x) = hton(x+offset)
where hton is the function that converts host bytes to IPv4
addresses.
Proof. Let first assume that there exists a subnet I ′ of size 212
with O ⊆ I ′ ⊆ S . If ZMap supports radix table then f (x) =
f1(R,x). Since f (x) is in O, then f1(R,x) is in I ′. We deduce
that there is a i0 such that R[i0] = I ′ and bx/212c= i0. From
the definition of f1, f1(R,x) is the jth address of the subnet
R[i0]. Hence we have f (x) = hton(N + j) with N the host
byte representation of the subnet R[i0] = I ′. Then f (x) =
hton((N − i0 · 212) + (i0 · 212 + j)) = hton(offset + x) with
offset = N− i0 ·212.
Now assume that ZMap still supports radix table, but
the minimal size of the subnets I ′ ⊇ O is greater than 212.
Let I ′′ such a minimal network. Then I ′′ = I0 ∪ ... ∪ Ik
where I0, ...,Ik are the subnets of I ′′ of size 212 ordered by
their prefix. From the previous part of the proof, there ex-
ist offset0,...,offsetk such that f (x) = hton(offset j + x) when
f (x) is in I j. However, it is easy to notice that if we write
offset j = N j− i j · 212, then N j = N0 + j · 212 and i j = i0 + j.
Therefore offset j = offset0 for all j ∈ {1, ...,k}.
Finally, assume that ZMap does not support radix compu-
tation or that the maximal size of the subnet I ′ ⊇ O is less
than 212. Then we have f (x) = f0(T,x). Since I is a subnet
of S , I is included in a subnet I ′ represented by a leaf l of T .
By definition f0(T,x) is the jth address of the subnet I ′, with
j = x−x0, and x0 is the index of the first address of I ′. Hence
we have f0(T,x) = hton(N+ j) with N the host byte represen-
tation of the prefix I ′. Therefore f (x) = hton((N−x0)+x) =
hton(offset+ x) with offset = N− x0.
At first glance, the second and the last hypotheses of the
proof lead to the same result and it seems useless to fulfill the
strongest hypothesis that I has size ≥ 212. There is, however,
a difference that has an impact on the detection: when the
monitored network is included in a subnet of size ≥ 212 with
no blacklisted address and ZMap supports radix table, then
there are only 220 possible values of offset. If the detection
method requires to compute the list of indices from the ob-
served addresses, then we may have to test 220 offsets, instead
of 232 values in the last hypothesis of the proof.
4.2 Detecting local scans
The first detection method that we present can be applied
to the scans for which S ⊆ O. This case occurs when the
observation network O is a large subnet of Internet (e.g. with
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prefix length 16), or if we want to detect small scans that are
local to the observation network (e.g. scans of prefix length
24 in an observation network of prefix length 22).
We also assume that the size of the scan n is close to the
prime number p used at the initialization of the scan. This
means that the subnet specified by the user (i.e. the whitelist
W ) is a subnet of prefix length 8,16,24,28 or 32 and the
blacklist B is disproportionately small compared to the size
of the whitelist.
Let o1,o2, and o3 be three consecutively observed IPv4
addresses. As described in Section 3, there is a sequence of
internal states si1 ,si2 ,si3 such that f (si1) = o1, f (si2) = o2,
f (si3) = o3. From the hypothesis on the small difference
between n and p, there is a high probability that si1+1 and si1+2
are less than n. Since S ⊆O, we deduce that f (si1+1), f (si1+2)
are in O and i2 = i1+1, i3 = i1+2, i.e. the internal states of
consecutively observed addresses are also consecutive. We
can apply the following theorem to retrieve g.
Theorem 2. Let o1,o2,o3 three IPv4 addresses such that
there exists an integer i with f (si) = o1, f (si+1) = o2,
f (si+2) = o3. Then we have
g =
h3−h1
h2−h1 −1 mod p
where h1, h2, h3 are the host byte representations of o1, o2,
o3.
Proof. From Theorem 1, h j = s j + offset for j in {1,2,3}.
By definition of the ZMap iteration process, we have hi ≡
s1 · gi−1 + offset (mod p) where the symbol ≡ denotes the
congruence relation in the modular arithmetic. We deduce
that h2−h1 ≡ s1 · (g−1) (mod p) and h3−h1 ≡ s1 · (g2−1)
(mod p)≡ s1 · (g+1) · (g−1) (mod p). Since g is a primi-
tive root, g 6= 1 and we have the result.
The description of the detection method is given in Al-
gorithm 4. Note that it does not require any hypothesis
on the offset value of the mapping function f . Once g is
known, it is possible to retrieve this value by computing
si = (h2−h1)/(g−1) mod p and offset= h1−si. This gives
additional information on the scanned addresses set S by us-
ing Theorem 1.
4.3 Detecting Internet-wide scans
We propose a second detection method that can be applied on
scans whose scope is much wider than the observation net-
work. Even if the monitored network size has an impact on the
computation time of the detection algorithm (see Section 4.5
and Section 5.1), it is possible to detect internet-wide scans
by using small monitored networks. The method requires at
least 20 packets for a high probability of success (see below).
Contrary to the previous method, it does not require consecu-
tive packets. In other words, packet loss does not impact the
success of this method.
Algorithm 4 Detection method Det1(p,(o j) j∈{1,...,m})
Let h j the host byte representation of o j for j ∈ {1, ...,m}
g← h3−h1h2−h1 −1
s← (h2−h1)(g−1) mod p
offset← h1− s
for j ∈ {4, ..,m} do
if h j 6= ((s ·g j) mod p+offset) then
return "not a ZMap scan"
end if
end for
return g,offset
This detection method relies on the following Theorem:
Theorem 3. Let (o1, ...,om) a sequence of scanned IPv4 ad-
dresses ordered according to their packet arrival times, and
(h1, ...,hm) their host byte representations. For b in Fp, let
loga(b) (or log(b) for simplicity) the integer x < p such
that b = ax mod p where a denotes a predefined primitive
root of Fp (i.e. a = 2 or a = 3 according to the value of
p∈ {p0, ..., p4}). If (o1, ...,om) is extracted from a ZMap scan,
then there is an integer k < p− 1 coprime with p− 1 such
that sequence (e2, ...,em) defined by
e j = log
(
h j−offset
h1−offset mod p
)
· k−1 mod p−1
is strictly increasing.
Furthermore, suppose that k satisfies the property above,
and let r = gcd(e2, ...,em) and k′ = k · r. Then, with some
additional assumptions on the discrete log distribution, we
have
Pr[(o1, ...,om) is a ZMap scan and k′ = log(g)]
≥
(
1− 1
(m−1)!
)φ(p−1)
where Pr is the probability measure and φ is the Euler’s totient
function.
Proof. Let (i1, ..., im) the sequence of state indexes such
that h j = si j + offset = ((s0 · gi j) mod p) + offset for j in
{1, ...,m}. Let δi j = i j− i1 for j in {2, ...,m}. δi2, ...,δim is
an increasing sequence and if k = log(g), then δi j = e j. This
proves the existence of k.
Notice that if δim p and if r is an integer with r < pδim and
r coprime with p−1, then the sequence r ·δi2, ...,r ·δim is also
increasing and r ·δi j = e j for k = log(g) · r−1 mod (p−1).
Let
A = {log(g) · r−1mod(p−1) | r < p
δim
and r coprime with p−1}.
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If k ∈ A, by assuming that gcd(δi2, ...,δim) = 1 then we have
r = gcd(e2, ...,em) and therefore log(g) = gcd(e2, ...,em) · k.
Now suppose that k 6∈ A and we want to estimate the prob-
ability that k satisfies the property of the theorem (A is the
empty set if o1, ...,om are not generated by a ZMap scan).
We assume that for any k, the sequence (e j) j∈{2,...,m} de-
fined by k is equidistributed. This assumption stems from
the fact that discrete logarithm has an uniform distribu-
tion on arithmetic subsets of Fp when p → ∞ as stated
in [20]. Let Prk(e2 < ... < em) the probality that the se-
quence (e2,...,em) defined for a fixed k is increasing. Then
for k 6∈ A,Prk(e2 < ... < em) = 1(m−1)! as there are (m− 1)!
permutations of {2, ...,m} and each ordering of (e j) j∈{2,...,m}
can be defined by one of these permutations. We also assume
that the probabilities that (e j) j∈{2,...,m} is not increasing are
independent for (almost) all k. Hence, the probability that for
all k 6∈ A, (e j) j∈{2,...,m} is not increasing can be bounded from
below by
∏
k coprime with (p−1)
Prk[(e j) j∈{2,...,m} is not
increasing] =
(
1− 1
(m−1)!
)φ(p−1)
.
Therefore, if k defines an increasing sequence (e j) j∈{2,...,m},
then
Pr[k ∈ A]≥
(
1− 1
(m−1)!
)φ(p−1)
.
The description of the ZMap detection algorithm is given
in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Detection method Det2(p,offset,(o j) j∈{1,...,m})
for j ∈ {2, ...,m} do
f j← loga
(
h j−offset
h1−offset mod p
)
with h j the host byte rep-
resentation of o j
end for
for k ∈ {1, ..., p−1} and k coprime with p−1 do
for j ∈ {2, ..,m} do
e j← f j · k
if e j ≤ e j−1 then
break
end if
if j = m then
r← gcd(e2, ...,em)
return g = ak·r
end if
end for
end for
return "not a ZMap scan"
The discrete logarithm loga can be efficiently computed
by using baby-step giant-step algorithm [35] or Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm [33]. The computation complexity of
the discrete logarithm is O(√p) for baby-step giant-step
and O (∑i yi(logn+
√
xi)) with n = p−1 =∏i xyii for Pohlig-
Hellman. Since the value of p is at most p4 = 232 + 15,
we can expect to perform the computation respectively in
216 or 210 operations. The iteration of k amongst the num-
bers coprime with p− 1 can also be efficiently performed
by precomputing the list of such coprime numbers and stor-
ing them into a file. During the main iteration loop of Al-
gorithm 5, the file takes at most 4 · φ(p4− 1) = 4,5 GB in
memory. Actually, the critical part of the algorithm is the
multiplication of the f j by k which is performed jm ·φ(p−1)
times in the worst case of a full iteration over the coprime
integers ( jm is the mean value of the least j ≤ m such that
e j ≤ e j−1, with the assumptions on the discrete log distribu-
tion of Theorem 3 we can show that jm = e ≈ 2.72). This
results in jm ·φ(p−1) = 2.72 ·1136578560≈ 232 operations
with p = p4.
The number of IPv4 addresses m extracted from the scan
has also an impact on the success of the detection method.
Let θ(m, p) = 1−
(
1− 1(m−1)!
)φ(p−1)
the upper bound of the
failure probability of Theorem 3 with m addresses. In the
context of ZMap scan detection, this failure probability corre-
sponds to the false positive rate. For p4 = 232+15, we have
θ(14, p4) = 0.16, θ(15, p4) = 0.013, θ(17, p4) = 5.4 · 10−5,
and θ(20, p4) = 9.3 ·10−9. As we test a high volume of scans
in our experiments, we select m = 20 for our implementation
of the detection tool to avoid false positives. Also note that,
when the offset value is known, the false negative rate is equal
to 0.
4.4 Offset computation
The drawback of the detection method Det2 is that it requires
to know the offset value of the generated IPv4 addresses (Sec-
tion 4.1). However, this value can be retrieved in two special
cases. The first case is when the scan does not use any black-
list (i.e. B = /0). The second case is when the scan uses the
default ZMap blacklist (i.e B =BZMap [7]). Let o1, ...,om be a
sequence of IPv4 addresses to characterize. For each whitelist
Wk that corresponds to a subnet tk of prefix length k contain-
ing o1, ...,om, we can compute the two corresponding offset
values offset
BZMap
k and offset
/0
k . Then, for each k ∈ {0, ...,24},
we apply Det2 with the inputs o1, ...,om, offsetik and pr(k)
where pr(k) is the prime number associated to the size of
the network tk. This overall detection method managed to
identify and characterize a large amount of ZMap scans, as
we will see later in our experiments (see Section 5).
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4.5 Offset brute forcing
When ZMap uses a custom blacklist, the detection and the
characterization of the scan can be performed by brute forcing
the offset value. If we assume that ZMap supports radix table
for IPv4 computation as described in Section 3 and that the
observation network O is included in a subnet I ⊆ S of size
≥ 212 (which is the case when O is a subnet with no black-
listed IP and S is an Internet-wide scan), we have shown in
Theorem 1 that there are 220 potential values for offset. There-
fore, there are 220 calls to Det2 for an exhaustive search of the
offset value. For each call of Algorithm 5, it is also possible
to reduce the number of integers k coprime with p− 1 that
are tested:
Theorem 4. Assume that (o1, ...,om) is a sequence of ZMap
probed IPv4 addresses in an observation network O which
is included in the total scanned addresses S . Let k a random
number drawn uniformly from the integers in {1, ..., p−1} co-
prime with p−1 and Γ the property on k defined in Theorem 3.
Then
Pr[k satisfies Γ]≈ |O|
(m−1) · |S | .
Proof. Let (o1, ...,ol) a sequence of probed IPv4 addresses
in the observation network and (i1, ..., il) the corresponding
indices of the states, i.e. o j = hton(si j + offset) for all j in
{1, ..., l}.
If we denote γ j = i j− i j−1 and γmean = mean{γ j | 2≤ j ≤
l}, then we can notice that for l sufficiently large, γmean = |S ||O| .
Since the sequence of γ j can be viewed as a sequence of
independent and identically distributed random variables of
mean γmean and δim = im− i1 = γ2 + ...+ γm, by the law of
large numbers we can approximate δim by δˆim = (m− 1) ·
γmean. Let
A = {log(g) · r−1 | r < p
δim
and r coprime with p−1}.
As we have shown in Theorem 3, if k is in A then k satisfies
Γ, and the probability that k satisfies Γ if k is not in A is very
small. Therefore
Pr[k satisfies Γ]≈ Pr[k ∈ A].
From our hypothesis on the discrete logarithm distribution,
we can assume that A is equally distributed in the integers
coprime with p−1. Hence
Pr[k ∈ A] = |A|
φ(p−1) =
1
δim
≈ |O|
(m−1) · |S | .
Theorem 4 underlines the fact that the size of the ob-
servation network O has an impact on the computation
time of Algorithm 5. If (o1, ...,om) is a sequence of ZMap
probed IPv4 addresses then the mean number of mod-
ular multiplications f j · k is equal to e·(m−1)·|S ||O| . For ex-
ample, on an Internet-wide scan where S = SInternet =
{"0.0.0.0", ...,”255.255.255.255"}, if the observation net-
work O is a /24 subnet and the number m of ZMap probed
addresses is equal to 20, then the mean number of operations
of Algorithm 5 is approximately equal to 19 ·2.72 ·224 = 230,
and if O is a /16 subnet then the mean number of operations
is approximately equal to 222.
Theorem 4 also shows that we can improve the computation
time of Algorithm 5 by reducing the number of tested integers
k accordingly to a confidence threshold α which will corre-
spond to the false negative rate. Let Tkmax the first kmax integers
coprime with p− 1. By applying Theorem 4, if (o1, ...,om)
is a ZMap scan and the integers k tested in Algorithm 5 are
restricted to Tkmax , then
1−α= Pr[∃k ∈ Tkmax s.t. k satisfies Γ]
≥ 1−
(
1− |O|
(m−1) · |S |
)kmax
where α is the false negative rate of the restricted algorithm.
By fixing the false negative rate α, the minimum number
of integers kmax to test is equal to
kmax ≈ log(α)
log(1− |O|(m−1)·|S | )
.
If we apply the restricted algorithm 220 times for an exhaus-
tive search of the offset value, then the overall false negative
rate is equal to 1− (1−α)220 and the mean number of opera-
tions is equal to kmax · e ·220.
Let consider the case of the detection and the characteri-
zation of ZMap Internet-wide scans with a custom blacklist
of IP addresses where S = SInternet and O is a /16 subnet. If
we want to achieve a false negative rate α = 10−8 for the
restricted version of Algorithm 5, then we can limit the num-
ber of integers coprime with p−1 to kmax = 225. The overall
false negative rate is equal to 0.01 and the overall number of
operations for each scan is equal to 246. This takes roughly
15 days on a single core of a Intel Xeon E7-4820.
4.6 Summary
We summarize the detection methods’ usages regarding scan
types in Table 1.
5 Results
This section presents our identification and characterization
results using Det2 and pre-computed offsets on synthetic and
real network traffic. We do not run the Det1 method because
the odds of observing three consecutive packets inside our
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Table 1: Scan types and detection methods.
Scan types Detection method
/24 scans or large observa-
tion network (>/16)
Det1
Scans with default or empty
blacklists
Det2 with offset computa-
tion
Scans with custom blacklists Det2 with offset brute forc-
ing
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Figure 2: Mean number of coprimes tested for several sizes
of observed prefix O.
datasets (see Section 5.2.1) are very low. We also do not run
the offset bruteforcing method because computing costs are
too expensive (see Section 4.5). The method used hereafter in
this section is Det2 with pre-computed offsets.
5.1 Synthetic data
In this section, we analyze the detection performance of the
method Det2 using synthetic data. We collect destination
IP address sequences using the -d (or –dryrun) option of
ZMap. For each prefix size between 0 and 24, we generate
100 sequences of ZMap scans with different seeds. Then, we
restrict each of these sequences to the IPv4 addresses that
lay into the observation network of the given prefix size. We
also ensure that we generate enough packets so that each scan
contains 20 packets in the observation network.
5.1.1 Size of observed prefix O vs detection runtime
In order to evaluate Det2 runtime, we measure the mean num-
ber of coprimes tested in the main loop of Algorithm 5 for
different observation network sizes. We use a single thread to
generate the packets. The detection method Det2 identify all
the ZMap scans and retrieve the correct generator g.
Figure 2 describes the mean number of iterations against
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Figure 3: Det2 success rate for 2, 4 and 10 threads for several
sizes of observed prefix O.
the sizes of observed prefix O. We observe that the empir-
ical results are similar to those obtained with the formula:
t(O) = (m−1) · |S ||O| . This validates the approximation of the
probability in Theorem 4.
5.1.2 Number of threads vs detection success
ZMap uses an option (-T) to control the number threads that
send probing packets. Threads use sharding (see Section 3.1)
to share packet sending. Using several threads may alter the
packet sending order and thus impacts detection success. Be-
fore December 6th, 2016 [3], the default number of threads
was the number of cores of the machine. In the current version
of ZMap (post [3]), the default number of thread is one.
Figure 3 depicts the method success rate against the num-
ber of threads used for several sizes of observed prefix O. We
here use the first 20 packets observed as input to the Det2
method. We observe that smaller numbers of threads yield
higher success rates. This is expected because when the thread
number increases, the odds of observing a sequence from dis-
tinct threads that cannot be identified also increase. Bigger
prefix sizes yield a smaller success rate for all configurations.
The first 20 packets are quicker to obtain with small prefix
sizes. We thus hypothesize that, for small prefix sizes, ob-
served packets are often sent by the first launched thread. As
the prefix size increases, the first 20 packets are increasingly
sent by distinct threads which alter the original order.
5.2 Real world traffic
This section presents our identification and characterization
results on real-world data.
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Table 2: Scan data breakdown.
# IP IP ID Telescope Backbone
TCP UDP TCP UDP
< 20 IP 546,259 11,599 717,643 39,303
>= 20 IP ZMap 12,200 6,944 17,737 2,869
Other 197,421 612 391,901 9,915
∑ 209,621 7,556 409,638 12,784
5.2.1 Datasets
We use two real-world network traffic datasets. The first
dataset was collected using a network telescope from June
2014 to January 2015. The observed prefix changes along
time, from a single /24 to three adjacent /24 prefixes inside
a /22. The second dataset is the MAWI repository [2]. This
dataset is collected on a Japanese backbone link. We use the
multi-day long traces captured during the Day In The Life of
Internet (DITL) event that took place on April 11th and 12th
in 2017. Unlike the publicly available MAWI traces where IP
addresses are anonymized, we use original IP addresses. We
restrict our observation to a single /16 to fulfill the hypothesis
on the observation network O from Section 4.1.
5.2.2 Pre-processing
We identify scanning IP addresses using two methods. First,
we extract source IP address that have at least a packet with
the ZMap fingerprint (IP ID field equals to 54321). Second,
we apply the Threshold Random Walk [24] method using
Zeek/Bro. We then compute the union of source IP addresses
extracted by the methods above, and keep only the IP ad-
dresses that send packets to at least 5 distinct destination IPs.
Individual scans performed by scanning IPs are then iden-
tified using a burst detection method [26]. Table 2 presents
detected scans. We breakdown scans with more and less than
20 packets because the Det2 method needs at least 20 pack-
ets (see Section 4.3). Scan with at least 95% of packets with
the ZMap fingerprint (see above) are labelled as ZMap in IP
ID-related column hereafter. Overall, we identify 1,314,804
scans, and apply the Det2 method on 639,599 ones.
5.2.3 Identification results
Table 3 presents the identification results. For the telescope
dataset, our method is successful on 37.8% ZMap scans using
TCP and 7.5% using UDP. For the backbone dataset, per-
centages of successful identification are lower: 24.1% (resp.
6.9%) for TCP (resp. UDP) scans. Overall, the majority of
identified scans use the default ZMap blacklist [7]. Only 3.5%
(resp. 1.8%) of ZMap TCP (resp. UDP) scans in the telescope
data and 5.5% of TCP scans in the backbone data do not use
any blacklist. This means that they actually send packets to
Table 3: ZMap identification results. BZMap is the default list
used by ZMap described at [7], /0 means that the scan does
not use any blacklist and BZMap∧ /0 represents both default
blacklist and lack thereof.
IP
ID
fie
ld Det2 Telescope Backbone
R
es
ul
t
B
la
ck
lis
t
us
ed
TCP UDP TCP UDP
# % # % # % # %
Z
M
ap
7 7,139 58.5 6,285 90.5 12,353 69.6 2,671 93.1
3
BZMap 4,617 37.8 519 7.5 4,281 24.1 198 6.9
/0 422 3.5 140 2.0 972 5.5 - -
BZMap∧ /0 22 0.2 - - 131 0.7 - -
∑ 5,061 41.5 659 9.5 5,384 30.4 198 6.9
∑ 12,200 6,944 17,737 2,869
O
th
er 7 197,421 100 612 100 391,898 100 9,915 100
3 BZMap - - - - 3 0.0 - -
IP addresses that are reserved such as private or multicast
addresses. They are thus needlessly increasing the workload
of their infrastructure and their upstream provider. We do not
identify 58.5% ZMap scans using TCP and 90.5% using UDP
in the telescope dataset, and 69.2% ZMap scans using TCP
and 93.1% using UDP in the backbone dataset. By analyz-
ing reverse-DNS entries, we discover probing entities that
confirm to us that they use customized blacklist. In the tele-
scope data, 60% of UDP scans with ZMap’s IPID are from
Rapid7 [1], and that 11% of TCP scans with ZMap’s IPID
are from University of Michigan [6]. We thus hypothesize
that, either unidentified scans use custom blacklists that we
could not identify, or use several threads (see Section 5.1.2),
or packet reordering occurred and our sampling strategy was
not sufficient to cope with this problem (see Section 5.2.5).
A small number of scans (22 in the telescope and 131 in the
backbone) have been identified by our tool as using both the
default ZMap blacklist, and no blacklist at the same time.
This is due to the fact that some of the precomputed offsets
offset
BZMap
k and offset
/0
k (as described in Section 4.4) are the
same when the scanned network is small. It is therefore im-
possible to determine if these scans use any blacklist. The
same generators are, however, returned in both cases, and it
is still possible to infer additional scan characteristics.
We detect 3 scans without the ZMap specific value for IP
ID field in the backbone dataset. These scans are performed
by 3 IP in the same /24 prefix. They have many common char-
acteristics: they start and finish around the same time, they
use the same generator g, exhibit low visibility (i.e. we do
not see all their packets, see Section 5.2.7), target the whole
Internet and the destination port is 443. We thus hypothe-
size that a single entity uses sharding to decrease detection
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Table 4: ZMap identification run time (mean ± standard devi-
ation in seconds). µ is the mean. σ is the standard deviation. x˜
is the median.
B
la
ck
lis
t
R
es
ul
t Telescope Backbone
µ ± σ x˜ µ ± σ x˜
/ 0
7 333.3 ± 100.9 290.6 178.5 ± 22.6 183.1
3 104.6 ± 93.7 59.2 56.0 ± 48.6 38.4
B Z
M
ap 7 351.3 ± 101.6 300.4 177.8 ± 22.6 182.
3 70.7 ± 38.1 58.5 57.1 ± 48.7 38.5
odds while removing ZMap IP ID field fingerprint to increase
stealthiness.
5.2.4 Run time
We instrument the execution time of our tool. The network
telescope dataset is analyzed using a machine with 4 Intel
Xeon E7-4820 (octo core with Hyper-Threading). The back-
bone dataset is analyzed using two machines with 2 Intel
Xeon E5-2650 (octo core with Hyper-Threading). In both
cases, we restrict the number of paralellized executions to
avoid Hyper-Threading. Each scan is analyzed by our method
using a single core. Table 4 details the measured execution
time. When the identification is successful, duration averages
slightly more than a minute for the telescope dataset and
slightly less than a minute for the backbone data. When our
method fails to identify a ZMap scan, the average run time
is around 5 minutes for the telescope data and 3 minutes for
backbone data.
5.2.5 Impact of destination IP address sequence sam-
pling
Packet reordering occurs on devices [11] or may be caused by
routing events [30]. Network traffic analysis showed diverse
percentage of packet reordering: 0.3 to 2% [32], 3.2% [36], 1
to 1.5% [23] and 0.074% [31]. These percentages are signifi-
cant and potentially threaten the result of our identification
method by inverting the order of consecutive observed pack-
ets oi. In order to alleviate this problem, we actually analyze
both the raw sequence of the first 20 observed packet oi and a
sampled sequence. This sequence contains 20 packets spread
in the raw sequence: the first packet is o1, the last one oc and
the 18 other packets are evenly spread between o1 and oc.
Figure 4 provide an example of the sampling procedure for
a scan with 41 packets. We analyze both the raw sequence
{o1 . . .o20} and the sampled sequence which contain oi with
i = 1 . . .41 and i an odd positive integer.
Table 5 presents the breakdown of our results regarding
sampling. In the telescope data, scans that were only suc-
Observed IP (ok)
Raw (20 first
packets) - •
Sampled (◦)
1
Figure 4: Example of raw (•) and sampled (◦) sequences for
a scan containing 41 destination IP addresses.
Table 5: Identification results of scans with the ZMap finger-
print regarding the raw (•) and sampled (◦) sequences.
B
la
ck
lis
t
Data
type
Telescope Backbone
TCP UDP TCP UDP
# % # % # % # %
B Z
M
ap
•∧◦ 4,513 97.7 444 85.5 3,975 92.9 16 8.1
•∧¬◦ 64 1.4 60 11.6 8 0.2 1 0.5
¬•∧◦ 40 0.9 15 2.9 298 7.0 181 91.4
∑ 4,617 519 4,281 198
/ 0
•∧◦ 350 82.9 105 75.0 954 98.1 - -
•∧¬◦ 36 8.5 20 14.3 2 0.2 - -
¬•∧◦ 36 8.5 15 10.7 16 1.6 - -
∑ 444 140 972 -
B Z
M
ap
-/ 0
•∧◦ 1 4.5 - - 4 3.1 - -
•∧¬◦ 4 18.2 - - 21 16.0 - -
¬•∧◦ 17 77.3 - - 106 80.9 - -
∑ 22 - 131 -
*
•∧◦ 4,864 96.1 549 83.3 4,933 91.6 16 8.1
•∧¬◦ 104 2.1 80 12.1 31 0.6 1 0.5
¬•∧◦ 93 1.8 30 4.6 420 7.8 181 91.4
∑ 5,061 659 5,384 198
cessfully identified with sampling represent a minority of all
scans: 1.8% for TCP and 4.6% for UDP. In backbone data,
“sampling only” exhibits a bigger percentage of successfully
identified scans: 7.8% of TCP scans and 91.4% of UDP ones.
We hypothesize that the bigger monitored prefix (65,535 IP
addresses in the backbone data and 768 IP addresses in the
telescope data) increases the odds of observing reordered
packets. Another possible explanation is that usual probing
speed increased from 2015 to 2017, and thus caused a packet
reordering rise. We also observe that some scan are identi-
fied with raw sequences but not with sampled sequences. We
hypothesize that this is due to time-splitting errors (see Sec-
tion 5.2.2). When this error happens, one or several scans
using distinct generators are merged together into a single
one. This causes the sampled sequence to contain observed
packets from one or more scans with distinct generators. In
that case, our method is not successful.
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Table 6: Targeted prefixes of scans with the ZMap fingerprint
with full percentages calculations.
B
la
ck
lis
t
Prefix
size
Telescope Backbone
TCP UDP TCP UDP
# % # % # % # %
B Z
M
ap 0 4,615 91.2 518 78.6 4,284 79.6 198 100.0
1 2 0.0 1 0.2 - - - -
/ 0
0 414 8.2 140 21.2 972 18.1 - -
1 5 0.1 - - - - - -
3 3 0.1 - - - - - -
B Z
M
ap
&
/ 0
5 1 0.0 - - - - - -
8 4 0.1 - - 131 2.4 - -
16 17 0.3 - - - - - -
*
0 5,029 99.4 658 99.8 5,256 97.6 198 100.0
1 7 0.1 1 0.2 - - - -
3 3 0.1 - - - - - -
5 1 0.0 - - - - - -
8 4 0.1 - - 131 2.4 - -
16 17 0.3 - - - - - -
S O
Time
k 1 2 3 4
Observed IPs (ok) x.x.x.7 x.x.x.1 x.x.x.9 x.x.x.5
Rank (rk(ok)) 1 2 3 5
Time (tk) 1 25 49 103
1
Figure 5: Example of scanned network S and observed net-
work O with missing packet for rk = 4 due to packet loss.
5.2.6 Targeted prefix
Table 6 details the prefix targeted by the identified ZMap
scans. More than 99% of scans found in the telescope data,
and more than 97% of scans identified in the backbone data,
target a /0 prefix. This is expected since ZMap is one of the
two main high speed scanning tools (with Masscan [22]) that
aim to perform fast and large scale probing. We however note
that some scans target smaller prefixes (e.g. /16).
5.2.7 Scan packet visibility and scan progress
Let o1, ...,om the observed probed addresses, and i1, ..., im the
indices of the associated ZMap states, i.e. o j = hton(si j +
o f f set) for all j ∈ {1, ...,m}. Det2 using offset computation
is able to identify the generator and the prefix of the scan.
Then, it is possible to retrieve the internal state and the state
index of any address ip in O relatively to the first observed
address o1. Hence, we can reorder the visible IP addresses of
the observation network O accordingly to their state indexes,
or in other words in their scan order. If ip ∈ O, we define
rk(ip) the rank of the address for this order starting from o1
with rk(o1) = 1 (see Figure 5). Formally, for each ip ∈ O let
δ(ip) = iip− i1 where iip is the index of the internal state that
corresponds to ip (i.e. ip = f (siip)). Then, rk(ip) = |{ip′ ∈
O | δ(ip′)< δ(ip)}|.
We then compute two metrics. First, we note P , the
progress of the scan. It is the relative position of the index
of the last observed probed address within the observed IP
addresses: P = rk(om)l where l is the size of O. This value
reflects the scan completion percentage. A P value lower
than one, means the scan did not reach all IP addresses in
the observed prefix O. This may be caused by sharding [9],
ZMap capping options (-n for probe number, -N for result
number, -t for time [8]), early interruption by user or incom-
plete data. Second, we note V the visibility of the scan. It is
the percentage of observed probing packet: V = mrk(om) . When
this value is lower than one, it means that some packets are
missing, either due to packet loss or sharding [9]. On Figure 5,
P = 510 = 50% and V =
4
5 = 80%.
Figure 6 present our results. For the telescope (resp. back-
bone) dataset, 72% (resp 85%) of identified scans have a V
greater than 95%. Scans with visibility smaller than 95% ex-
hibit either progress smaller than 20% (67% in the telescope
dataset and 30% in backbone data), or progress higher than
90% (16% in the telescope dataset and 57% in backbone
data). We hypothesize that scans with low visibility exhibit
low progress because they were stopped as soon as users no-
ticed packet loss or upstream overload. Scans with visibility
higher than 95% exhibit a behavior similar to those with low
visibility regarding progress P . These scans’ progress values
are either smaller than 20% (40.8% in the telescope dataset
and 99.7% in backbone data), or higher than 90% (34.8% in
the telescope dataset and 0.04% in backbone data). We notice
some peaks for progress value of 5 and 10% in Figure 6a.
We hypothesize that these values are common for users that
do not want to scan the full IPv4 address space and use the
-n option in ZMap. Sharding causes visibility values lower
than 50%. It is visible on the lower right part of Figure 6a
and on the lower part of Figure 6b. We observe many scans
with visibility values around 0.4 and 2.5% in Figure 6b. We
hypothesize that these scans uses sharding among 250 and 40
distinct sources.
5.2.8 Generator reuse
We analyze the generator g (see Section 3.1) values identified
by our method. Generator can be set using the seed option (-e)
for repeatability or reproducibility purposes, or, to perform
sharding (see Section 3.1) from several machines or network
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Figure 6: Scatter plot, histograms and ECDF of visibility V (percentage of observed probing packets) vs progress P of scans
with the ZMap fingerprint.
Table 7: Breakdown of the numbers of IP address that we that
identified that used specific generators: 3 or 12.
Blacklist g value Telescope Backbone
TCP UDP TCP UDP
BZMap
3 9 4 3 -
12 11 4 2 -
/0
3 9 1 4 -
12 6 2 - -
interfaces. We first notice that specific generators (3 and 12)
are dominant across scans. Table 7 details these occurrences.
We could not find an explanation to the unusual occurrence of
these peculiar values. Table 8 presents generator reuse across
IP addresses inside both datasets for g other than 3 and 12. We
observe several instance of generator reuse across a number of
IP ranging from 2 to 39. This is consistent with the sharding
observed on Figure 6. Furthermore, we notice that generator
reuse mainly occur across IP located in the same /24. We hy-
pothesize that scanning entities usually use several colocated
machines or VMs from a single provider. We however notice
that only 1.4% (resp 34%) of group of source IP in the tele-
scope (resp. backbone) dataset sharing generator values have
a visibility V value smaller than 50%. We thus hypothesize
that the majority of generator reuse is linked to setting of a
Table 8: Breakdown of generators used by more than one IP.
The first line means that we identify one group group of 2
IP located in the same /24 with the same g performing TCP
scans in the network telescope and 6 group of 2 to 28 IPs .
B
la
ck
lis
t Src IP
location
Telescope Backbone
TCP UDP TCP UDP
#g #IP #g #IP #g #IP #g #IP
B Z
M
ap
Same /24
1 2 - 6 2-28 -
- - 1 3 -
- - 1 4 -
Several /24 - - 8 39
Distinct /24 - - - 1 2
Mixed 1 3 - - -
/ 0
Same /24 17 2 - 6 2-28 -
Distinct /24
2 2 3 2 - -
1 3 - - -
constant seed (-e option) for reproducibility purpose, and not
sharding.
12
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Figure 7: Emitted packet rate of scans with the ZMap fingerprint and breakdown regarding the use of sampling. Black (resp. red)
curves represents scans only identified with or without (resp. only with) the sampled sequence. BL: BZMap and no BL: /0.
5.2.9 Emitted packet rate
The number of packets emitted between the first probe o1
and the last one om can be retrieved by computing δrk =
rk(om)− rk(o1). The elapsed time between the first observed
packet and the last is δt = tm− t1 (see Figure 5). We define
the emitted packet rate epr as: epr = δrkδt =
rk(om)−rk(o1)
tm−t1 .
Figure 7 depicts emitted packet rate of scans. In order to
provide reference, we build epr values for a SYN scan that
uses 100Mb, 1GbE and 10GbE. We chose the SYN scan
because it is the most common type of ZMap scan observed
[16]. Red curves show scans that were only identified using
sampled sequence while black ones represents scans identified
with or without sampled sequence. Scans only identified using
sampled sequence exhibit a higher emitted packet rate than
other scans. We observe that scans identified without any
blacklist exhibit a lower packet rate than scans detected with
the default ZMap blacklist. Emitted packet rates are usually
lower than 100Mb for TCP scans in the backbone dataset.
Other scans (TCP and UDP for the telescope dataset and UDP
for the backbone dataset) are mostly smaller than 1GbE. 1.1%
of scans in the telescope dataset and 0.4% in the backbone
dataset exhibit epr consistent with a throughput greater than
1GbE. Their visibility V (see Section 5.2.7) values are very
small: for the telescope dataset, the median value is 3% and
the mean is 4.5%, for the backbone dataset, these values are
0.04% and 1.9%. We hypothesize that high speed packet rate
saturates network equipment in the upstream provider of the
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source IP, yielding packet losses.
6 Discussions
Overall, Det2 identification performance in a controlled setup
are perfect (see Section 5.1.1). We however do not identify
58.5% ZMap scans using TCP and 90.5% using UDP in the
telescope dataset, and 69.2% ZMap scans using TCP and
93.1% using UDP in the backbone dataset. By analyzing
reverse DNS records, we find that a significant proportion
of scans with ZMap’s IPID originate from entities that use
custom blacklists (see Section 5.2.3). Other possble expla-
nations are the use of several threads (see Section 5.1.2), or
acute packet reordering (see Section 5.2.5). While threading
and packet reordering are linked to ZMap usage and network
conditions, and thus beyond our reach, customized blacklist
can be accounted for using offset bruteforce Section 4.5. We
thus intend to accelerate offset bruteforcing using GPUs.
We identify two biases for our characterization Section 5.2.
First, backbone data capture duration is 48 hours. Computed
progress P (see Section 5.2.7) values of scans which were
not completely captured may thus be lower than their real
value. We however could not access bigger backbone dataset
to increase the reliability of our data. Second, we identified
and characterized 28.5% of all scans in our datasets. Our
characterization results may thus be biased towards scans that
were identified by the Det2 method. We want to improve our
identification methods to reduce this bias.
We show in Section 4.1 that, in the context of the exclusion
requests documented by Durumeric et al. [16], if O is a /16
subnetwork, then probability that O fulfills the hypothesis
regarding blacklisted addresses is 77%. This probability in-
creases to 98% if O is a /20 subnetwork. The size difference
between the backbone dataset and the telescope one may thus
explain why Det2 is less successful on the backbone dataset.
The new sharding mechanism [5] introduced in September
2017 impacts some of our metrics. The progress value P of
a completely observed scan will be 1d , with d the number of
shards. Our results are not affected by this change because
our data was collected before it occurred. Future experiments
shall however be careful when using feature like P .
Ruth et al. [34] use ICMP answers to ZMap scans to gather
information on the Internet’s control plane. We envision that
our identification method is able to detect packet loss or packet
reordering on Internet. By using several ZMap scan observa-
tion points, and by combining this input with routing informa-
tion, it may be possible to locate and diagnose performance
problems or failures.
7 Conclusions
In this work, we propose two cryptogranalysis methods to
identify ZMap scanning. We then apply the Det2 method with
pre-computed offsets to synthetic and real-world traffic, and
evaluate its efficiency and computing cost. Finally, we provide
an in-depth analysis of ZMap usage in the wild regarding
impact of packet reordering, targeted prefix, generator reuse,
probing progress and visibility, sharding and probing speed.
We thus identify several misuses, such as private IP address
probing and packet rate above upstream capacity, that waste
network resources.
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Supplementary results
7.0.1 Observed packet rate
The number of observed packets sent by the scanning IP is m.
We note the receiving time of o1 (resp. om), t1 (resp. tm) (see
Figure 5). The elapsed time between the first observed packet
and the last is δt = tm− t1. We define the observed packet rate
opr as: opr = mδt =
m
tm−t1 .
Figure 8 presents the observed packet rate in our data. In
order to provide reference for opr values, we build opr val-
ues for a SYN scan that uses standard network speeds such
as 100Mb, 1GbE and 10GbE for each datasets. For exam-
ple, such a scan using 1GbE would generate 0.40 packet per
second in the telescope dataset, and 34 packets per second
in the backbone dataset. We chose the SYN scan because it
is the most common type of ZMap scan observed [16]. In
both datasets, the observed packet rate of most scans with
the ZMap fingerprint are consistent with a throughput smaller
than 1GbE. Some scans nonetheless exhibit a throughput big-
ger than 1GbE. They may use the same IP on several devices
to perform sharding. We however assess that this behavior is
unlikely because it requires more configuration compared to
standard sharding, and, above all, increases detection odds.
We thus hypothesize that these scans actually targets small
prefixes. We also observe that the Det2 method is less success-
ful when opr increases. High throughput may increase packet
reordering, and thus degrades our identification abilities. Fig-
ure 8 shows that scans without the ZMap fingerprint exhibit a
much higher observed rate than scans with the fingerprint. We
hypothesize that these scans target smaller network prefixes
in higher proportion than ZMap scans.
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(e) Non-ZMap FP - TCP
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(f) Non-ZMap FP - UDP
Figure 8: Stacked histogram of observed packet rate. Attack success is green while failure is red. Dark green represent scans
that were only identified with sampled sequence. Light green represent scans were identified with or without sampled sequence.
Vertical lines represent the theoretical observed packet rates in our three /24 prefixes for a /0 SYN scan performed by ZMap
using a single source with 1GbE and 10GbE upstreams.
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